On 25 October 2026 Microsoft released an out-of-band security update for .NET 8, .NET 9, .NET 10 and .NET 11 Release Candidate 3. The headline fix is CVE-2026-111497: a buffer overflow in the Brotli decompression library used by .NET. Some industry commentary has nicknamed the issue “HTTP2Shell”, but Microsoft’s advisory describes it plainly as an out-of-bounds write in the Brotli decoder.
The practical question for engineering and security teams is narrower than the nickname suggests. You are not exposed merely because an affected .NET package is installed. Exposure depends on whether your application decompresses attacker-controlled Brotli data. This article summarises Microsoft’s guidance, shows how to check your estate, and explains why keeping patch evidence matters when you face SOC 2, ISO 27001 or Cyber Essentials scrutiny.
What happened
According to Microsoft’s security advisory GHSA-p3jp-9v83-76w9, a buffer overflow exists in the Brotli decompression library used by .NET. An unauthenticated attacker may read or corrupt process memory. That can lead to information disclosure, denial of service or elevation of privilege. Microsoft rates the issue as High, with a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1 and weakness CWE-787 (Out-of-bounds Write).
The .NET blog post on the October 2026 out-of-band updates confirms the same impact and lists the patched runtime versions. .NET Framework is not affected.
Who is exposed, and who is not
ASP.NET Core request decompression and HttpClient automatic response decompression are not enabled by default. Microsoft is explicit: an application is not exposed merely because an affected package is present. You become exposed when your code takes one of these paths:
- ASP.NET Core automatic request decompression with Brotli (
br) enabled. - HttpClient automatic response decompression configured with
DecompressionMethods.BrotliorDecompressionMethods.AllonHttpClientHandlerorSocketsHttpHandler. - Direct use of Brotli APIs in
System.IO.Compression, such asBrotliStreamorBrotliDecoder, on attacker-controlled data. - NativeAOT applications that link the affected decoder and decompress untrusted Brotli input.
If none of those apply, install the update on a normal cadence and move on. If any of them do, treat this as a priority patch.
Fixed runtime versions
- .NET 8: 8.0.33 (SDK 8.0.133 / 8.0.427)
- .NET 9: 9.0.22 (SDK 9.0.123 / 9.0.320)
- .NET 10: 10.0.14 (SDK 10.0.114 / 10.0.403)
- .NET 11 previews: 11.0.0-rc.3.26522.148
How to check your applications
Start with the code, then confirm the runtime.
1. Search the codebase
Look for the call sites Microsoft calls out:
AddRequestDecompression— and whetherbris among the providers.AutomaticDecompression— especially values that include Brotli or All.BrotliStreamandBrotliDecoder— any use on data that a client, peer or untrusted file can influence.
A simple ripgrep-style pass across your repositories is enough for the first pass. Record which services hit each pattern; that list becomes your exposure inventory.
2. Check installed runtimes
On each host that runs framework-dependent .NET apps:
dotnet --list-runtimes
Confirm that Microsoft.NETCore.App shows at least 8.0.33, 9.0.22 or 10.0.14 for the major versions you run. Self-contained apps and containers carry their own runtime, so a host-level update alone does not protect them.
3. Separate deployment styles
- Framework-dependent: install the updated runtime, then restart the application.
- Self-contained: rebuild and republish with the updated runtime, then redeploy.
- Containers: rebuild images from updated .NET base images and redeploy.
- NativeAOT: update the SDK and any explicit compiler or runtime-pack references, then republish. Updating the shared runtime on the machine does not replace a decoder already linked into the executable.
How to fix it
Microsoft’s recommended fix is to install the updated runtime or SDK for the .NET version your application targets, then restart. Download packages from dotnet.microsoft.com/download/dotnet. If your project references an affected package directly, bump that reference to the patched version listed in the advisory.
For self-contained and containerised workloads, rebuild and redeploy is mandatory. Leaving an old runtime bundled inside an image or publish folder keeps the vulnerable decoder in production even after the host is patched.
Interim mitigation if you cannot patch immediately
Until the update is deployed, avoid decompressing attacker-controlled Brotli data. If you already use decompression, Microsoft shows how to remove Brotli without inventing new decompression behaviour:
- For ASP.NET Core request decompression already in place, remove the
brentry from your existing providers (gzip and deflate can remain). - For HttpClient handlers that already set
AutomaticDecompression, dropDecompressionMethods.Brotliso the flags cover only what you still need, such as GZip and Deflate. - For direct
BrotliStream/BrotliDecoderuse, stop passing untrusted Brotli data to those APIs until you are on a fixed runtime.
Do not add AddRequestDecompression or an AutomaticDecompression assignment if your application does not already use them. Enabling automatic decompression can introduce denial-of-service risk even when Brotli is excluded. Mitigation is a temporary bridge; the update remains the fix.
Why patch evidence matters for audits
SOC 2, ISO 27001 and Cyber Essentials all expect you to show that vulnerabilities are identified, risk-assessed and remediated in a controlled way. A CVE like this is a useful test of that system:
- Inventory: which services use .NET, which versions, and which enable Brotli decompression.
- Decision: exposed services patched on an emergency track; non-exposed services on the normal cadence, with a recorded rationale.
- Change records: runtime versions before and after, image digests, deployment tickets and restart times.
- Verification:
dotnet --list-runtimesoutput, rebuilt image tags, and confirmation that interim mitigations were removed once the patch landed.
Auditors rarely ask whether you read the advisory. They ask whether you can prove what you ran last Tuesday and what you run now. Screenshot folders and chat threads age badly; dated configuration and deployment evidence ages well. That is the same discipline behind continuous cloud compliance evidence for AWS and Azure controls.
A practical 48-hour plan
- Broadcast the advisory and the exposure criteria to service owners.
- Run the codebase search and collect
dotnet --list-runtimesfrom production hosts. - Classify services as exposed, possibly exposed, or not exposed.
- Patch and restart framework-dependent exposed services first.
- Rebuild and redeploy self-contained apps and containers.
- Apply interim mitigations only where a rebuild cannot land within your emergency window.
- File the inventory, change records and verification output in your evidence store.
PyraLink™ Prove
When auditors ask for proof of cloud control operation, PyraLink Prove collects read-only, dated configuration evidence from AWS and Azure that you can map to SOC 2, ISO 27001 and related frameworks. It is not a runtime CVE scanner; it helps you keep the cloud compliance evidence that sits alongside your patch records.
Request a PyraLink Prove Demo ↗Frequently asked questions
Am I exposed to CVE-2026-111497 by default?
No. Microsoft states that ASP.NET Core request decompression and HttpClient automatic response decompression are not enabled by default. Exposure requires decompressing attacker-controlled Brotli data through one of the paths in the advisory.
Is .NET Framework affected?
No. Microsoft’s advisory states that .NET Framework is not affected.
Which runtime versions fix the issue?
Install .NET 8.0.33, 9.0.22, 10.0.14, or .NET 11 RC3 (11.0.0-rc.3.26522.148). Self-contained and NativeAOT apps must be rebuilt and redeployed.
What should I do if I cannot patch today?
If you already decompress Brotli, remove br from request decompression providers or drop Brotli from AutomaticDecompression. Do not add decompression configuration that was not already present. Patching remains the recommended fix.
Does PyraLink Prove cover this CVE?
No. PyraLink Prove collects read-only cloud configuration evidence for compliance frameworks. Runtime CVE patching is a separate engineering control; keep both evidence trails.
Sources: Microsoft Security Advisory GHSA-p3jp-9v83-76w9 (CVE-2026-111497); .NET Blog: October 2026 Out-of-Band Security Updates; Download .NET.